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EDITORIAL
Recognition of the truth of Secretary
Mellon’s statement that the high sur
taxes are steadily becoming unproductive
appears to be gradually dawning on
congress. In some quarters this recog
nition is evidenced mainly in a display of indignation that men
or even natural laws should fail to conform to the ideas of
congress.
Recently a senator characterized as “little short of actual dis
loyalty to this republic” the truism repeated by a wealthy man,
that wealth always seeks to avoid what it regards as excessive
taxation.
Now we can all agree that in an ideal republic every man
would conduct his affairs and pay his taxes according to the intent
of the law-making body, and no one would change his business
conduct as so to reduce his taxes in ways not contemplated by
the legislature.
In this ideal republic, of course, the tax would be administered
not upon technicalities and nice interpretations of the letter of
the law, but upon broad considerations of equity and regard for
its spirit.
And above all the legislature would frame the tax law with
an eye single to the apportionment of the inevitable burden among
the citizens of the republic in the most equitable way that could
be conceived.
So long, however, as the guiding principle in the allocation of
the tax burden is political advantage and the assignment (in the
first instance, at any rate) of the maximum burden to the mini
mum number of voters; so long, too, as the rule governing court
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decisions is that quoted by the supreme court recently from an
English decision—

“If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter
of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may
appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the
crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject
within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however appar
ently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise
appear to be.”
so long as these conditions continue, is it not a little naive for
any one to expect those at whom the measures are aimed to make
no move either to defend themselves or to escape from the impost ?
The more serious aspect of the situation is that the next
phase is apt to be an ill-considered attempt to assert the dignity
and power of congress.
If one law fails to produce the result the legislator desires let
another more drastic be enacted. Its practical efficiency will prob
ably be no greater and it will almost assuredly do much harm to
many at whom it is not directed, but for the moment it will
satisfy the outraged dignity and serve the political fortunes of
the legislator who has pledged himself to the policy of making
the rich pay without passing the tax on to others, natural laws
and all other opposition to the contrary notwithstanding.
The professional man whose means of protection or escape
are meagre views the situation with deep concern realizing that
measures which the capitalist would probably be able gracefully
to avoid would be likely to fall in their full weight upon him.
The ostensible beneficiary of such measures, too, would, if he
appreciated the situation, be equally concerned because unsound
schemes of taxation are sure in one way or another ultimately to
prove injurious to the general community.
Much of the tax is passed directly on to the community; the
demand for tax exempts stimulates improvident state and
municipal expenditures, which in turn increase local taxes falling
on everyone; the interest rate on issues not exempt is increased
and the increase ultimately reflected in costs and prices. Thus
and in innumerable other ways do men and economic forces
“conspire” to defeat the efforts of congress to run counter to
natural laws.
In this connection the following extract from the examination
of a witness by the English house of commons is of interest:
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“Q. How is the assembly composed ? What kind of people are
the members; landholders or traders ?
A. It is composed of landholders, merchants and artificers.
Q. Are not the majority landholders?
A. I believe they are.
Q. Do not they, as much as possible, shift the tax off from
the land, to ease that, and lay the burden heavier on trade?
A. I have never understood it so. I never heard such a thing
suggested. And indeed an attempt of that kind could
answer no purpose. The merchant or trader is always
skilled in figures, and ready with his pen and ink. If
unequal burdens are laid on his trade, he puts an addi
tional price on his goods; and the consumers, who are
chiefly landholders, finally pay the greatest part, if not the
whole.”
The examination took place in 1766, and the witness was
Benjamin Franklin.
The ways and means committee though
Earned Income
retaining the 25 per cent. deduction of
and
tax on earned income proposes to treat
Tax Exempts
all income under $5,000 as earned, and
all over $20,000 as unearned; in other
words, the committee has concluded that anybody can earn $5,000
and that nobody is worth more than $20,000 a year.
As a recognition of the economic fact that the earner has to
set aside out of his income capital to provide for himself in his
old age, whereas the possessor of investment income is under no
such necessity, the committee’s action hardly merits consideration,
however interesting it may be as indicating the result of intro
spection and personal experience of members of committee. Its
maximum effect would be to save the earner about $400 a year
under the present scale of taxes, and $300 a year under the
suggested Mellon scale. Such sums set aside annually for twenty
years at 5 per cent. would provide capital sums which would
yield perhaps $500 or $600 a year thereafter.
The relief is in substance insignificant but being nominally
large (25 per cent.) may deprive taxpayers of real relief in some
other form.
The salaried, professional, and artist classes whose hopes were
raised by the secretary’s letter may well say with Macbeth—
“And be these juggling fiends no more believ’d
That palter with us in a double sense:
That keep the word of promise to our ear,
And break it to our hope.”
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Many will regard this language as equally applicable to those
members of the house who voted to continue tax exemption as a
refuge for the rich, while vigorously demanding high surtaxes.
The opponents of the constitutional amendment differed on
the question how much the exemption feature saves in interest
to the issuers of tax exempt bonds. Clearly, however, this saving
is trivial compared to the saving of tax to the rich buyers.
Whether it is a little more or a little less than the Treasury esti
mated is of slight consequence. The greater it is, the more savings
bank investors are being mulcted for a privilege that is valueless
to them; the smaller it is, the less the wealthy are paying for a
privilege that is most valuable to them.
The vital point is that it is entirely contrary to the principles
of a democratic state that an amount of wealth increasing, it is
estimated, at the rate of something like a billion dollars a year,
should be completely beyond the reach of the taxing power,
however great a national emergency may arise.
In another section of this month’s Journal
of Accountancy appears a very interest
ing description of the profit-sharing plans
in operation today in banks and financial
institutions. Not the least interesting of this material is that
setting forth the reason for the adoption of these plans and the
primary purposes to be served by them. Two things stand out
noticeably: firstly, the desire “to put the employees into closer
relation with the officers of the bank and to give them a real
interest in the results of its operations,” and secondly, possibly
in some cases a more immediate reason, “to find some satisfactory
substitute for the war bonuses or extra salary payments which
many banks gave their employees during the years of the world
war.” One of these purposes, it will be observed, has directly in
mind the benefit to the institution by which the individual is
employed, while the other seems to be more immediately inter
ested in the employee himself. Both motives are entirely
praiseworthy.
The results of these plans, while not uniform and not always
entirely satisfactory, are likewise of real interest. “Through the
operation of the plan all employees are made partners in the
institution” seems to be the more common feeling with reference
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to the matter. Employees as a whole like to feel and to believe
that their services are appreciated, and, other things being equal,
a recognition of this nature is bound to bear fruit. Greater loyalty,
more constant attention to duties, and a real desire for construc
tive service are some of the positive advantages of such plans; a
smaller labor turnover reduces, and perhaps largely offsets, the
cost of its operation.
In a new and rapidly-growing profession like public account
ancy is there not, in the experience of these bankers and financial
houses, real food for thought? Nowhere so much as in a personal
service organization does the personality of the individual worker
count; and how better can the practising public accountant of
today assure himself of competent help than by giving the members
of his staff a share in the profits of the firm? Already a number
of profit-sharing plans are being used by large and small firm
accountants alike, and on the whole we believe such schemes have
proved most satisfactory both to employer and to employee. It
means a great deal to an ambitious employee to feel that he is a
partner in the profits of the firm which employs him; it means
much to an employing public accountant to have a staff of loyal,
ambitious and satisfied assistants. Nobody loses, everybody gains,
by such an arrangement. With such complete cooperation of
employer and employee many of the ills of our present economic
order would completely disappear.

At the moment of going to press we are
advised
that the successful paper in the
Prize Competition
prize competition is that submitted under
the nom de plume of Francis Parker Elliott by Mr. S. Gundel
finger, C. P. A., of Sacramento, California. We extend our
congratulations to him.
We are advised that the jury considered the papers as a rule
disappointing, and that it is not contemplated that any subsidiary
prizes will be awarded, except that for the best paper submitted
by a member of the Institute which has not yet been decided upon.
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